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Lewis v. Clarke, 135 A.3d 677 (Conn. 2016) 
 
Lillian M. Alvernaz 
 
The nation to nation relationship between tribes and the federal 
government is unique. Within that relationship, the federal government 
acknowledges and respects tribal sovereignty. An important aspect of 
sovereignty is sovereign immunity. Lewis v. Clarke confronts the 
applicability of sovereign immunity through an extension of tribal 
sovereignty over an employee defendant.1 After having heard oral 
argument, the United States Supreme Court could either reaffirm or 
severely limit the applicability of tribal sovereign immunity to “arms” of 
a tribe.2  While the lower court analyzed tribal sovereign immunity by 
considering the damages sought, the Supreme Court opinion portends to 
extend far beyond just this negligence claim.3  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Reversing the lower court’s analysis, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut extended tribal sovereign immunity to an individual 
defendant employed by the tribe, rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to seek 
damages against the defendant in an individual capacity.4 While driving a 
vehicle on behalf of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority (“MTGA”), 
the defendant collided with the plaintiff’s car, injuring the plaintiffs.5 Both 
parties agree that the MTGA is an arm of the Tribe.6 In an attempt to 
bypass tribal sovereign immunity, the plaintiffs assert that by naming the 
defendant in an individual capacity and seeking damages in such capacity, 
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not reach the defendant.7 In 
response, the defendant asserts he was acting within the scope of his 
employment and his employer is an “arm” of the tribe, thereby extending 
tribal sovereign immunity over his action.8 
 The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is well established.9 It 
is a long acknowledged principle that the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity encompasses individual “tribal officials” who act in their 
“representative capacity and within the scope of their authority.”10 Only 
when a tribal official acts outside, or beyond, the scope of their authority 
                                                     
1. Lewis v. Clarke (Clarke I), 135 A.3d 677 (Conn. 2016). 
2. Lewis v. Clarke (Clarke II), 132 S. Ct. 416 (2016). 
3. Clarke I, 135 A.3d at 678. 
4. Id. at 685. 
5. Id. at 678. 
6. Id. at 680. 
7. Id. at 679. 
8. Id. at 680. 
9. Id. at 682 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold 
Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877 (1986)). 
10. Id. at 683 (quoting Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 
1997)).  
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to act on behalf of the tribe,11 will the court consider a claim against a tribal 
official in an individual capacity.12 
 The trial court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument limiting tribal 
sovereign immunity for damages sought from the defendant in his 
individual capacity.13 The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut reversed.14 Plaintiffs, now petitioners, successfully petitioned 
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.15 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 On October 22, 2011, the plaintiffs were traveling southbound on 
Interstate 95 in Norwalk, Connecticut.16 The defendant was following the 
plaintiffs in a limousine owned by the MTGA.17 While following the 
plaintiffs, the defendant unexpectedly drove the limousine into the rear 
end of the plaintiffs’ vehicle, causing their vehicle to crash and come to 
rest on the concrete highway barrier.18 The plaintiffs were injured.19 Both 
the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs and the wreck itself were negligently 
caused by the defendant.20 
 The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant claiming 
their injuries from the collision were due to the defendant’s negligence and 
carelessness.21 The defendant motioned to dismiss the complaint and 
asserted the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 
doctrine of tribal immunity extended to protect him from liability.22 The 
defendant also filed an affidavit from the MTGA director of transportation, 
Michael Hamilton, to support his motion.23 
 The plaintiffs disagreed with the defendant’s motion and claimed 
tribal sovereign immunity did not extend to the defendant’s actions.24 
Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted the trial court had subject matter 
jurisdiction because the defendant was named in his individual capacity 
and damages were sought against him, not the tribe.25 The trial court 
                                                     
11. Id. (quoting Basset Mashantucket Pequot Museum & Research 
Center, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 271, 280 (D. Conn 2002); see Garcia v. Akwesasne 
Housing Authority, 105 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that an 
individual capacity claim against a tribal official claim may proceed if the tribal 
official acted outside their scope of delegated authority)).   
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 677. 
14. Id.  
15. Clarke II, 137 S. Ct. 416. 
16. Clarke I, 135 A.3d. at 678. 
17. Id. at 679. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id.  
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
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subsequently denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and found it had 
jurisdiction under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity because the 
plaintiffs’ claims sought money damages against the defendant in his 
individual capacity, not from the MTGA.26  
The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly 
denied his motion to dismiss.27 The defendant asserted the trial court 
improperly denied extending tribal sovereign immunity.28 Further, the 
defendant asserted: (1) he was acting within the scope of his employment 
with the MTGA, an arm of the Mohegan Tribe; and (2) tribal sovereign 
immunity prohibits the plaintiffs’ claims against him.29 
Plaintiffs contended the trial court was correct to deny the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.30 The plaintiffs specifically asserted that 
the remedy sought would not affect the tribe because the damages were 
sought against the defendant in his individual capacity.31 The plaintiffs 
further alleged tribal sovereign immunity should not reach their claim and 
deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.32 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut found the undisputed facts to 
show the defendant was an employee of the tribe and was acting within 
his scope of employment when the collision occurred.33 Thus, the Court 
concluded that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity reached the 
plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant.34 The Court agreed with the 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut’s determination 
that the plaintiffs may not avoid the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity 
by naming the tribal employee defendant in an individual capacity when 
he was acting within the scope of his employment.35 The Court held the 
trial court’s finding that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity did not 
reach the defendant’s actions was an improper determination.36 Thus, the 
Court found the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the plaintiffs complaint improper.37 The Court  reversed the lower court’s 
judgment and remanded with instruction to grant the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss.38 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted the 
plaintiff’s petition for certiorari.39 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
                                                     
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 680. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 685. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 686. 
38. Id. 
39. Clarke II, 137 S. Ct. 416. 
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A.  Trial Court’s Denial of the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
 
 Generally, denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final judgment 
that may be appealed because it is an interlocutory ruling.40 Though, when 
the denial of a motion to dismiss contains a colorable claim of sovereign 
immunity, such action is an immediately appealable final judgment 
“because the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that 
further proceedings cannot affect them.”41 Further, a motion to dismiss 
based on tribal sovereign immunity, filed by tribal employees, is a final 
judgment for purposes of an appeal.42 Here, the defendant’s motion was 
final because of the tribal sovereign immunity claim.43 The Supreme Court 
of Connecticut found the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
appealable.44 
 
B.  Trial Court’s Dismissal of Jurisdictional Challenge 
 
Since the defendant’s appeal was proper, the Court then examined 
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.45 Defendant asserted that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were prohibited because the defendant was acting within 
the scope of his employment for the Mohegan Tribe when the incident 
occurred.46 The defendant further contended that the Court should grant 
his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the tribal 
sovereign immunity implicated from his employment with the Mohegan 
Tribe.47 The Court’s standard of review is de novo because of the review 
of the lower court’s “ultimate legal conclusion.”48 
 Prior to the defendant filing his motion to dismiss, the plaintiff 
dropped the MTGA as a defendant.49 The Supreme Court of Connecticut 
found that the only issue for the trial court to decide regarding the motion 
to dismiss, was whether the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity 
prohibited the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant in his individual 
capacity.50 
 
C. Sovereign Immunity is Foundational for Tribal Sovereignty 
 
                                                     
40. Clarke I, 135 A.3d at 680 (quoting Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 A.2d 
128 (Conn. 2007)). 
41. Id. (quoting Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 A.2d 128 (Conn. 2007)). 
42. Id. (citing Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, Inc. 260 A.2d 498 
(Conn. 2002)). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. (citing Bloom v. Gershon, 856 A.2d 335 (Conn. 2004) (A 
determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law)). 
48. Id. (quoting Gold v. Rowland, 994 A.2d 106 (Conn. 2010)). 
49. Id. at 682. 
50. Id. 
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 Immunity from suit enjoyed by sovereign entities is among the 
“core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess.”51 Tribes exercise inherent 
sovereign authority as domestic dependent nations.52 As dependent 
nations, tribes are subject to Congressional plenary authority.53 At the 
same time, tribes “remain separate sovereigns [preexisting] the 
[c]onstitution.”54 For that reason, “unless and until” Congress specifically 
acts, tribes retain their inherent authority as sovereigns.55  
 Immunity from suit is necessary and essential to tribal sovereignty 
and self-governance.56 Due to Congress’s plenary power over Indian 
affairs, a tribe’s immunity rests in Congress’s hands.57 Because of this, 
unless Congress specifically expresses an abrogation of such immunity, 
“courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends to undermine 
Indian self-government.”58 
 
D. The Defendant was Acting Within the Scope of His Employment 
  
A tribal official is only “stripped” of tribal authority, and thus 
tribal immunity, when the officer acts “manifestly or palpably beyond his 
authority.”59 However, tribal sovereign immunity does extend to 
individual employees acting within the scope of their employment.60 Thus, 
plaintiffs may not avoid tribal sovereign immunity by naming tribal 
employees individually for actions by defendants in such capacities.61  
The plaintiffs do not dispute the defendant was employed by the 
MTGA.62 Further, the plaintiffs presented no evidence establishing the 
defendant’s actions as outside the scope of his employment at the time of 
the collision.63 The Supreme Court of Connecticut looked to these 
undisputed facts and found that the defendant was acting within the scope 
of his employment when he wrecked into the plaintiffs and injured them.64 
                                                     
51. Id. at 681 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold 
Reservation, 476 U.S. at 877). 
52. Id. (citing Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)). 
53. Id. (see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (the constitution 
grants Congress powers we have consistently described as plenary and exclusive to 
legislate in respect to Indian tribes)). 
54. Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 
(1978). 
55. Id. (see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)). 
56. Id. at 682 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold 
Reservation, 476 U.S. at 877). 
57. Id.  
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 683 (quoting Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Museum & 
Research Center, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 271, 280 (2002)). 
60. Id. at 682 (citing Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, Inc. 260 A.2d 
498 (Conn. 2002)). 
61. Id. (citing Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F. 3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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Because the defendant was an employee, acting within the scope of his 
employment, he is afforded tribal sovereign immunity regardless of the 
suit being brought against him in his individual capacity.65 The Court 
upheld this interpretation of the law.66 
 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Lewis v. Clarke is a crucial decision in federal Indian law 
regarding tribal sovereignty. Because of the nature of federal Indian law, 
tribes across the nation will be influenced by this tribal sovereign 
immunity determination. In the era of self-determination, Clarke will 
serve to either undermine the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity or 
further entrench the long-standing doctrine as a fundamental aspect of 
tribal sovereignty.  
                                                     
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
